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JAN DELHEY
Abstract
This paper analyses the impact enlargements have had on the integration of the European
Union (EU). For this purpose, integration was conceptualised as the sense of community
across national boundaries and measured as interpersonal trust between EU nationalities.
Eurobarometer surveys form the database used, with country dyads serving as units of
analysis. The key result is that enlargements do not necessarily weaken trust. Enlargement
to the North has actually strengthened trust levels within the EU, despite extending the
Community from the central city belt to the Nordic periphery. Enlargements to the South
and East, however, have weakened trust levels. The integrative effect of enlargement
depends on the extent to which acceding nations differ from existing club members in three
main dimensions: the level of modernisation (mechanisms: prestige), cultural characteris-
tics (mechanisms: similarity) and their power in the international system (mechanisms:
perceived threat). A cautiously optimistic conclusion can be drawn from the observation
that in the past, after each wave of territorial extension, trust has subsequently increased.
Zusammenfassung
In diesem Beitrag werden die Auswirkungen der Erweiterungen auf die Integration der EU
untersucht. „Integration“ wird dabei gemessen über transnationales Vertrauen: das Aus-
maß des generalisierten zwischenmenschlichen Vertrauens, das die EU-Völker ineinander
setzen. Eurobarometer-Umfragen der Jahre 1976-1997 dienen als Datenbasis, dyadische
Länderpaare als Untersuchungsfälle. Erweiterungen schwächen nicht automatisch den
Zusammenhalt. So wirkte die Norderweiterung Vertrauen stärkend, obwohl sie vom
Städtegürtelzentrum zur nordischen Peripherie ging. Jedoch haben die Süd- und Oster-
weiterung das Vertrauen geschwächt. Der integrative Effekt von Erweiterungen hängt
davon ab, in welchem Maße sich die beitretenden Nationen in drei Schlüsseldimensionen
von den Mitgliedern unterscheiden: der am Modernitätsgrad hängenden Reputation, der
kulturellen Ähnlichkeit und der an Bevölkerungsgröße und Militärpotential hängenden
Bedrohlichkeit. Die Osterweiterung hat die Gemeinschaft in den zwei erstgenannten
Dimensionen (weiter) heterogenisiert, und die derzeit geplanten Erweiterungen werden
dies auch tun. Vorsichtigen Optimismus kann man aus der Tatsache ableiten, dass bislang
auf jeder Erweiterungsstufe das gegenseitige Vertrauen nach den Erweiterungen ange-
wachsen ist. Es ist durchaus denkbar, dass wir eine ähnliche atmosphärische Verbesserung
in der osterweiterten EU erleben.
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1 Introduction
The recent enlargement of May 2004 has turned the European Union from a Western into
a pan-European integration project that now encompasses the majority of European nations.
The geographical extensions have made the Community more diverse in many respects:
socio-economically, politically and culturally. Although a certain degree of diversity is
unavoidable in supra-national community building (Zielonka and Mair 2002), eastward
enlargement in particular has been accompanied by fears that a Community of 25 will be
too heterogeneous to continue along the road to political integration. Scholars have mainly
dealt with the problem of diversity at the institutional level of the EU system, focusing in
particular on conflicting interests and decision-making processes (De Witte 2002, König
and Bräuninger 2000). The present article, in contrast, analyses the impact of enlargements
on the level of social trust people have vis-à-vis other EU nationalities, thereby linking the
issue to the broader problem of social integration within the Community. Since social trust
is conducive to cooperation, the production of collective goods, and solidarity (Uslaner
2002), decreasing levels of trust would be an alarm signal for the Community.
Despite its potential importance, there is little information available on the effects the
several waves of enlargement have had on processes of community building within the EU.
Are the stretching of borders and the increasing diversity within the EU obstacles to social
integration between the EU nationalities? This paper analyses the impact enlargements have
had on the integration of the EU and ventures to assess the probable impacts of future
accessions. For this purpose, I measure “integration” in terms of the level of generalised
interpersonal trust flowing between the different EU nationalities, which I refer to as
transnational trust. The key result is that enlargements do not necessarily weaken trust.
Enlargement to the North has actually strengthened trust levels, despite extending the
Community from the central city belt to the Nordic periphery. Enlargement to the South and
East, however, have weakened integration. The integrative effect of enlargement depends
to what extent acceding nations differ from existing club members in three main dimen-
sions: the level of modernisation (mechanisms: prestige), cultural characteristics (mecha-
nisms: similarity) and their power in the international system (mechanisms: perceived
threat).
The article is organised as follows: First, I briefly introduce a sociological understanding
of “integration” (section 2). The conditions under which enlargements are likely to lead to
a deterioration in integration are then outlined; the “incorporation of heterogeneity” is
identified as a key factor (section 3). The data base – selected Eurobarometer surveys from
1976-1997 – is described in section 4. In the empirical part of the paper, I trace the
development of transnational trust both over time and enlargements (section 5) and analyse
why nations trust each other (section 6). The final section 7 draws some conclusions from
the main findings.
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2 Transnational trust and the integration of the EU –
conceptual considerations
Do EU citizens form an integrated societal community with high levels of mutual trust? This
very question shows that my definition of integration draws heavily on the ideas of Karl
Deutsch, who referred to integration as the sense of community between peoples (Deutsch,
et al. 1966). In Deutsch’s view, integration as a learning process among the mass of people
has to precede political amalgamation, which is then carried out by the elites. A sense of
community has many facets. In this paper, I am concentrating on one crucial aspect, which
figures quite prominently in the social capital literature as a means of forging links between
people, namely generalised trust. More precisely, the paper focuses on generalised trust in
people from other member states – what we might call transnational trust. Trust is the
expectation that others will behave in a predicable and friendly manner (Inglehart 1991).
This includes the expectation that they will not knowingly do one harm and look after one’s
interests, if possible. Trusting people are more willing than non-trusting to cooperate and
to produce collective goods. Trust is also seen as a precondition for solidary behaviour
(Uslaner 2002). In contrast, distrust implies an unbridgeable social distance from others,
which may find expression in either indifference or ill-will. The level of generalised social
trust flowing within the European Community (its social capital, to use a fancy term) is a
good indicator of how integrated this community as an assembly of 25 national citizenries
potentially is. The barometer of transnational social trust, which measures how much trust
each member state’s population has in another, indicates how easy or difficult it is to
mobilise solidarity within the European Union. For supranational communities, trust as a
modern form of social relation (Seligman 1997) is even more valuable, since they, unlike
nation states, cannot rely on an assumed sense of mechanic solidarity and strong feelings
of identity among its citizens (Münch 1993, Münch 2001).
Admittedly, trust is only one of several forces that contribute to the development of
integration. Common values also play their role (Gerhards and Hölscher 2005), as do civil
rights. Citizenship of the Union constitutes a distinct membership space, which distinguish-
es EU citizens from non-EU citizens (Bach 2000, Bach 2003, Ferrera 2005). Furthermore,
trust guarantees neither solidarity nor any desire for political unification. It is perfectly
possible to trust other nationalities without pursuing unification. Without trust, however, it
would scarcely be possible to implement solidary policies among the member states or to
deepen political cooperation. Research shows that citizens’ support for European integra-
tion is, among other things, also driven by the level of trust in the other member states
(Genna 2003).
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3 EU enlargements, geographic extension and the
import of heterogeneity
Stepwise enlargements have extended the EU’s territory in a distinctive pattern, from the
core of the European city belt to the periphery (Vobruba 2003). On the one hand,
Community membership has exerted a magnetic pull, especially for less wealthy countries.
On the other hand, member states have a vital self-interest in not being an outpost of the EU,
which makes them eager to back their neighbours’ attempts to join. As a consequence, a
sense of community has to be established between ever more distant units. Presumably, this
territorial expansion is a first barrier to the development of trust, especially if one accepts
the argument that familiarity breeds trust.
What might be even more momentous than the mere geographic dilution of trust is the
incorporation of heterogeneity, which might constitute a second barrier. Historically,
Europe has always had a polymorphic structure characterised by divisions and diversity.
The main cultural division has been between northern Protestantism and southern Catholi-
cism, whereas the main political-economic division has been between the well developed
West and the less developed East (Rokkan 1999, Therborn 1995). Even today, these
differences have not been levelled out. Through enlargements, the Community has
gradually incorporated this polymorphic diversity, converting previously external differ-
ences into internal ones.
The original EC was made up of Catholic or mixed Protestant-Catholic Western
European neighbours, parts of whose territories at least belonged historically to the
medieval city belt (Rokkan 1999). By definition, all successive enlargements have in-
creased geographic distances. However, they have also, to differing extents, increased
diversity (Lewis 2001). The first enlargement incorporated, for the first time, two predom-
inantly Protestant countries, Denmark and the UK, as well as Catholic Ireland, then a
relatively poor and backward country. With southern enlargement, three less wealthy and
agrarian countries, with recent experience of political authoritarianism, became members.
With its Greek Orthodox religion and own script, Greece was the odd one out in cultural
terms. Northern enlargement was less problematic, since the three acceding countries were
highly developed in economic terms, had a lengthy record of well-established social
democracy and were well known – and sometimes even admired – for their neutrality and
stability. The recent enlargement towards the East was of a different kind from previous
enlargements, and not only because ten countries entered at the same time (Schmitter and
Torreblanca 2001). For the first time, former Communist countries joined the EU. In the
past, the Communist threat had been a major driving force in the political amalgamation of
Western Europe (Cerruti 2001, Wallace 1999). In the accession region, anomic tendencies
(e.g. corruption) are more widespread and the economic contrast with Western Europe is
striking. With Slavic and Baltic languages, two additional language families were added to
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the existing linguistic diversity. To sum up, the 25 national collectivities assembled together
today are more heterogeneous in terms of living standards, political values, social practices
and culture than ever before (Alber and Fahey 2004, Fuchs and Klingemann 2002, Gerhards
and Hölscher 2005, Heidenreich 2003). To the extent that integration is dependent on
similarity, a detrimental impact on the EU’s level of integration can be expected.
Several research studies have found evidence of a trade-off between heterogeneity and
integration. Comparative historical sociology teaches us that nation state building and the
linguistic, religious, economic and administrative homogenisation of territories have been
mutually reinforcing processes (Flora 2000, Rokkan 1999). Similarly, the founding fathers
of integration studies assumed that establishing international political communities would
be much easier if the countries involved had a great deal in common (Nye 1971). The
experience of almost every single society show that “others”, whether minorities, immi-
grants, foreign workers, resettlers or asylum seekers, are sometimes difficult to integrate.
I restrict myself here to research on trust. Ethnic or linguistic fragmentation of a given
society tends to result in low rates of interpersonal trust (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002,
Delhey and Newton 2004). Similarly, marked social inequalities complicate the emergence
of a trust culture (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002, Bornschier 2001, Delhey and Newton 2004,
Uslaner 2002). Belief-congruence theory, developed by social psychologists (Rokeach, et
al. 1960), might provide a general explanation, since it suggests that the more others are
perceived as deviating from the norms and values of our own group, the more we view them
with prejudice – and the less trustful we are. Research has shown the social distance people
feel vis-à-vis other nationalities is smaller in some places and greater in others (Delhey
2004a, Fuchs, et al. 1993). Whom EU citizens include in their feelings of trust and whom
they exclude is the subject of the following analysis.
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4 Database and the measurement of trust
We rely for our analysis on data from the European Commission’s Eurobarometer survey
programme. The Eurobarometer (EB) is a biannual set of public opinion polls conducted in
the member states since the early 1970s. The surveys are representative of the population
aged 15 and over in each country. Sample sizes are usually around 1,000 respondents, except
for Luxembourg which has a sample size of 600, Germany, which has 2,000 (since
unification), and the UK, which has 1,300.1 Questions on social trust in nationalities are not
a core part of the EB, but were included nine times between 1976 and 1997, allowing
changes over a twenty-year period to be tracked. The following analysis is based mainly on
EB 47.0 from 1997, the most recent survey available. Unfortunately, more recent data are
not available, but national images (of which images of trustworthiness are part) can be seen
as rather stable constructs (Deutsch and Merritt 1965). Additional analysis has been carried
out using EB 6 from 1976, EB 14 (1980), EB 25 (1986), EB 33 (1990), EB 39.0 (1993), EB
41.1 (1994), EB 44.0 (1995) and EB 46.0 (1996).
The central indicator is a question which directly asks about trust in people from various
countries. The question from the 1997 survey reads as follows:2
“Now, I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in
people from various countries. For each, please tell me whether you (1) tend to
trust them or (2) tend not to trust them?”
A list of all the EU nationalities (Belgians, Danes, Germans etc.), plus some non-EU
nationalities, was attached. Thus each respondent was delivering a judgement about the
trustworthiness of people from the EU countries, including their own co-nationals. From
this information a second-order data set was constructed in which the unit is each
nationality’s rating of the trustworthiness of each of the other nationalities (one-directional
dyadic trust). For each pair of countries, an index of trust ranging from +100 to -100 was
computed, using the procedure developed by Merritt (Merritt 1968). A value of +100
indicates that all members of a national collectivity tend to trust people from a certain
country, whereas the score –100 indicates complete lack of trust. A score of zero indicates
a balance between equally strong shares of trusters and non-trusters. A second index,
familiarity, reveals how many respondents are actually able to rate another nationality’s
trustworthiness, whether positively or negatively. Values range from 0 (completely unfa-
miliar, low salience) to 100 (completely familiar, high salience).
In order to analyse the network of trust relations within the Community, a saturated
network would provide ideal conditions, so that each nation can be analysed in two ways,
as truster (the nation doing the rating) and trusted (the nation being rated)3. Such a network
is available for the EC/EU with 6, 9, 12 and 15 members, but not with the current 25
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Table 1: Available trust ratings from EB 47.0
* Imputed from EB 46.0 (1996).
** Imputed from EB 33 (1990).
*** BG and RO only rated by the EC-12 nations.
Bold figures denote nations added (as trusters or trusted).
Country codes (order as appearing in the table):
BE Belgium, DE Germany, FR France, IT Italy, LU Luxembourg, NL Netherlands, DK Denmark, IE Ire-
land, UK United Kingdom, GR Greece, ES Spain, PT Portugal, AT Austria, FI Finland, SE Sweden, CZ
Czech Republic, HU Hungary, PL Poland, SK Slovakia, TK Turkey, BG Bulgaria, RO Romania.
 
 Rating nation 
(truster) 
Rated nation 
(trusted) 
Available 
trust 
ratings 
(cases = 
country 
dyads) 
Cases 
needed for 
saturated 
network  
Coverage 
(in %) 
Saturated network 
EC/EU-6 6 
BE, DE, FR, IT, LU, 
NL 
6 
BE, DE, FR, IT, LU, 
NL 
30 30 100 % 
EC/EU-9 9 
BE, DE, FR, IT, LU, 
NL,  
DK, IE, UK 
9 
BE, DE, FR, IT, LU, 
NL, 
DK, IE, UK 
72 72 100 % 
EC/EU-12 12 
BE, DE, FR, IT, LU, 
NL, DK, IE, UK, 
GR, ES, PT 
12 
BE, DE, FR, IT, LU, 
NL, DK, IE, UK, 
GR, ES, PT 
132 132 100 % 
EU-15 15 
BE, DE, FR, IT, LU, 
NL, DK, IE, UK, 
GR, ES, PT 
AT, FI, SE 
15 
BE, DE, FR, IT, LU, 
NL, DK, IE, UK, 
GR, ES, PT, 
AT, FI, SE 
210 210 100 % 
Incomplete network 
EU-19 
Best 
approximation to 
EU-25 
15 
(as EU-15) 
BE, DE, FR, IT, LU, 
NL, DK, IE, UK, 
GR, ES, PT, AT, FI, 
SE 
19 
 
BE, DE, FR, IT, LU, 
NL, DK, IE, UK, 
GR, ES, PT, AT, FI, 
SE,  
CZ, HU, PL, SK*  
270 600 45 % 
Europe 15 
(as EU-15***) 
BE, DE, FR, IT, LU, 
NL, DK, IE, UK, 
GR, ES, PT AT, FI, 
SE 
25 
 
BE, DE, FR, IT, LU, 
NL, DK, IE, UK, 
GR, ES, PT, AT, FI, 
SE, CZ, HU, PL, 
SK*, 
TK*, BG**, 
RO** 
309 756 41 % 
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members (Table 1). With the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, only four of
the recent accession countries are listed in the surveys as recipients of trust, and the surveys
were conducted only in the old member states. Consequently, we do not know how much
the new EU citizens from the East trust people from the old member states and how much
they trust each other. Currently, we have less than half of the picture for the EU-25.4 Beyond
current member states, the EB data also include ratings of the trustworthiness of people from
the candidate countries Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey.
5 Trust among Europeans: descriptive analysis
Centrifugal and centripetal enlargements
Below, a Union of 6, 9, 12, 15, and – as far as possible – 25 member states is simulated,
following the historical expansions and using current (1997) trust relations.5 The objective
is to classify enlargements with respect to their impact on integration: some might have
strengthened the overall level of trust, others might have weakened it. For each stage of
extension, the scattergrams simultaneously display the levels of trust and familiarity
between nationalities; each dot represents a country dyad (Figure 1).
To a large extent, the publics of the six founding member states trust each other and are
familiar with each other (top left scattergram). For example, people from Luxembourg are
strongly trusted by the Belgians, French and Dutch and people from Belgium are strongly
trusted by the French. Only the Italians are rated by the Dutch as rather untrustworthy.
Now we add the country dyads resulting from north-western enlargement (top right
scattergram). On the trust dimension, the new dyads (black dots) are spread in much the
same way as the EU-6 dyads (grey dots). On the familiarity dimension, however, there is a
difference: the EU-9 contains more dyads of low familiarity, compared to the EU-6. For
example, the Irish are rather unfamiliar with people from Belgium, Denmark and Luxem-
bourg; likewise, the British are unfamiliar with Luxembourgers. In each case, less than 40%
of the population have a firm opinion as to whether people from the rated nation can
generally be trusted or not.
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The simulation of the southern enlargement reveals a double centrifugal impact (centre
left scattergram). None of the new dyads qualifies as a high-trust relation. Ten of the 60 new
dyads are characterised by non-trust rather than trust and for a further four dyads trust and
non-trust are precisely in balance. The Greeks in particular show low levels of transnational
trust, particularly towards the Germans and the British. With regard to familiarity, the
Spanish have more difficulties than any other national group in rating the trustworthiness
of people from other member states.
The northern enlargement, which brought Austria, Finland and Sweden into the EU,
strengthened overall trust (centre right scattergram). The majority of the country dyads
added are characterised by high levels of trust. Highly consensually, people from these
countries are seen as trustworthy by their EU partners, and in turn they themselves exhibit
high levels of transnational trust (the Swedes and Finns more so than the Austrians).
Finally, the impact of the recent eastward enlargement is comparable to southern
enlargement (bottom left scattergram). None of the new country dyads is a high-trust
relation and half of them are characterised by prevailing non-trust. The surveys show a rather
low level of trust on the part of old EU members (particularly Germany and Austria) in
citizens from the post-socialist new member states. Germans and Austrians seem to be
especially worried about eastward enlargement for specific reasons – mass immigration
from the east and the assumed negative effects of job competition, reduction in wage levels
and crime (Weiss and Strodl 2003). Indeed, two thirds of potential migrants from the
accession countries name Germany as their favourite destination and a further ten percent
name Austria (Commission 2001).
To sum up, the EU would today enjoy a higher level of social integration if it were still
composed of the six founding members. Along both dimensions, the EU-25 is least
cohesive. A key message from this descriptive account is that enlargements might give rise
to integration costs (as was the case with the southern and eastern enlargements) but do not
necessarily do so (e.g. northern enlargement). It depends on which countries are brought
together.
Some caution is warranted in evaluating the eastward enlargement because we do not
have the information to fully assess the impact of this last wave of accessions. The actual
situation of the EU-25 might look more pleasant – or unpleasant. Meanwhile, membership
status might have helped to improve the perceived trustworthiness of the accession
countries. Similarly, the massive and by and large friendly media coverage in the run-up to
May 2004 might have rubbed off on public attitudes in Western Europe. However, the actual
situation might also look more unpleasant. Here we can rely on information on general
interpersonal trust (the tried and tested question “can most people be trusted”?) stemming
from other, more recent surveys like the European Value Survey (EVS) or the European
Quality of Life Survey (EQLS).6
In the EU-15, 38% say that most people can be trusted (EVS data, simple country
average). In the accession countries, only 21% are of this opinion.7 The bulk of accession
countries rank among the “low-trust societies” and none of them among the “high-trust
societies” (Delhey and Newton 2004). In this context, it is instructive to know that in 1998
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Figure 1: Current levels of trust between EU nationalities, by enlargement step
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a quarter of the population in post-Communist countries felt threatened by their neighbour-
ing countries, although this feeling was declining during the 1990s (Haerpfer 2002).
Overall, there is evidence to suggest that the incomplete Eurobarometer data tend to lead us
to overestimate rather than underestimate the level of transnational trust within the EU-25.
The last diagram (bottom right scattergram) additionally takes into account the trust
relations with the candidate countries Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey, which are universally
seen as rather unreliable by EU 15 citizens. In particular, trust in Turks is in short supply
(Delhey 2004a). Thus it is foreseeable that the coming south-eastern enlargement, which
is projected for 2007 with Bulgaria and Romania making the opening, will bring increasing
difficulties for the EU’s social integration – not only because Western Europeans have such
negative, stereotyped opinions about them (which Beck and Grande have condemned as
“Western European racism” (Beck and Grande 2004)), but also because Bulgaria, Croatia
and Romania on their part are “low-trust societies” and Turkey virtually a “no-trust society”,
with only 7% having confidence in “most people” (EVS data).
A diachronic comparison: how different is the EU-25 from previous
Communities?
It may be, however, that we have to apply another standard: perhaps the eastward (and
southward) enlargement should be compared with the EC-6 immediately after its formation,
or with the EC-9 immediately after the accession of Great Britain, Denmark and Ireland. The
data allow for such diachronic comparisons, albeit at a rudimentary level.8 A comparison
of this kind does indeed put the impression that eastward enlargement had a strongly
centrifugal impact into perspective (Figure 2). For the EC-6 of the 1970s, the country dyads
are scattered across our two-dimensional field in much the same way as for the EU-25 of
today. By and large, at that time the nationalities of the EC-6 did not trust each other any
more than the nationalities of the enlarged Union do today. Germany serves as a good
example. True, the Germans trust the Poles today less than they trusted the Italians in 1976;
however, they trust the Czechs and Hungarians now more than they did the Italians then.
With respect to familiarity, dispersion was even greater in the EC-6 back then than in the
current EU-25. Hence one can argue that the recent accessions have not put integration
under pressure to an unknown extent; rather, they took the Community on a journey thirty
years back into its own history. But again, caution is warranted because we do not have the
information to fully assess the impact of this last wave of enlargement.
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Is trust growing over time?
Even more cause for optimism might be derived from the fact that between 1976 and 1997,
the West European barometer of trust was on a largely upward trend (Delhey 2004a,
Inglehart 1991, Niedermayer 1995). Figure 3 demonstrates this development for the
countries of the EC/EU-9 with the help of two snapshots taken more then twenty years apart.
As can readily be seen, the dots are more dispersed in the left-hand snapshot (representing
the EC-9 in 1976) than in the right-hand snapshot (1997). The EU nationalities have grown
closer both in terms of trust and in terms of familiarity. In the 1970s, a handful of dyads
existed that were moulded by low trust. At that time, the Germans, Dutch and Luxembourg-
ers had a particularly negative stereotyped image of the Italians, as did the Luxembourgers
with regard to the Irish. With respect to our second indicator, familiarity, only 36% of the
Danes and Irish were able to judge the trustworthiness of people from Luxembourg; almost
two-thirds answered “I do not know”. By the end of the 1990s, the lion’s share of the
population in each country was familiar with the partner nations and levels of trust had
increased. Prevailing non-trust in particular has become rare (for instance, the British still
mistrust people from Germany and France and the Dutch mistrust people from Italy).
Calculation of the averages across all 72 dyads within the EC/EU-9 show that the trust
barometer has risen from 36 to 49, and the familiarity barometer from 72 to 86. The data
cannot provide an answer to the pressing question of what forces have been driving this
Figure 2: Level of trust between nationalities, diachronic comparison of EC 6 and EU 25
-100 -75 -50 -25 0 25 50 75 100
trust score, 1976
0
20
40
60
80
100
fa
m
ili
ar
ity
 s
co
re
, 1
97
6
 
-100 -75 -50 -25 0 25 50 75 100
trust score, 1997
0
20
40
60
80
100
fa
m
ili
ar
ity
 s
co
re
, 1
99
7
 
 
EC 6 EU 19 (proxy for EU 25) 
PAGE 14
A TRADE-OFF BETWEEN ENLARGEMENTS AND INTEGRATION?
increase in trust. The increase in tourism, convergence of life-styles, generational exchange,
long-standing cooperation within EU institutions or the lasting absence of war – all these
processes might have contributed to growing trust and familiarity.
In the past, after each wave of territorial extension, trust has grown subsequently. This
was the case for the EC-6, EC-9 and EC-12 (for the EU-15, the time series is too short to
make a sound statement). The 64 dollar question is: can we expect a similar development
for the last enlargement? Some optimism can be derived from the fact that those national-
ities – the Italians, Greeks, Portuguese, Spanish and Irish – that initially met with some
scepticism have benefited particularly from growing cosmopolitanism. Insofar as their
gains in attributed trustworthiness have something to do with membership status or
successful modernisation, citizens from the ten new member states may well come to inspire
greater trust over time. It is highly likely that trust in East Europeans will increase in the post-
accession years, as was the case for the Southern countries. As Kovacs (2004: 96) has put
it: “We have admitted them [the Easterners] to our club, the Western Europeans might say,
hence they cannot be that bad”.9 However, at least in the short run the social trust that may
be needed to underpin the “European project” is in short supply.
However, history does not always repeat itself. One warning signal might be evidence
that, between 1990 and 1997, transnational trust among West Europeans began to drop
slightly in some countries (Delhey 2004a). Interestingly enough, mass support for the EU
has shown a similar downturn (see Fuchs, 2002). It remains to be seen whether the recent
downturn is a lasting trend. It is perfectly possible that, in retrospect, the period 1970-1990
will turn out to be an exceptionally favoured period that came to a sudden end with the
collapse of the Eastern bloc. In Western Europe, at least, there is currently no climate of
Figure 3: Level of trust between EU 9 nationalities, 1976 and 1997
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increasing cosmopolitanism that will automatically include people from the new member
states. Furthermore, any great optimism about citizens of the new member states in their
capacity as trusters might well be misplaced. In Ireland, the United Kingdom and Portugal,
levels of transnational trust remained by and large unchanged after accession, while in
Greece they actually declined in the long run. Non-trust in EU Europeans has become the
dominant feeling among Greeks since the mid-1990s. How long it will take to come to terms
with the momentous events of 1989 and to put the European project on a path that instils new
confidence in people is a question that remains unresolved.
6 Why do nations trust other nationalities?
In order to forecast the impact of coming enlargements on a more systematic basis, it is
helpful to learn more about the rationale behind the trust ratings. A multivariate regression
analysis can give us deeper insights. It is based on 309 cases, which is the number of dyadic
trust ratings available for the EU-25 plus the candidate countries Bulgaria, Romania, and
Turkey. The dependent variable is the level of dyadic trust the single nations vest in other
individual nationalities. A detailed description of predictor variables is provided in the
Appendix.
The following considerations are tested against data (cf. Inglehart 1991):
? Does trust diminish with spatial distance? For the computations, the distance (as
the crow flies) between the capitals of each pair of countries was used as predictor
variable.
? Does Community membership produce a positive balance on what might be called
the ‘trust account’? This idea is empirically tested by introducing a variable measur-
ing the common membership years of each pair of countries.
? Is cultural similarity a necessary precondition for trust? Religion and language can
be seen as fundamental to the establishment of shared values and world views,
which in turn are often seen as indispensable for mutual trust (Earle and Cvetkovich
1995). In the analysis, I concentrate on two variables, language similarity and reli-
gious similarity between each pair of countries.
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? Is trust influenced by levels of modernisation? Here, the argument is twofold. First,
with respect to the nationalities as trusters, it is likely that modern (rich, democrat-
ic) societies have stronger trust cultures (Sztompka 1999), and due to their cultural
norms they are also more ready to vest trust in people from other countries. Second,
with respect to the nationalities as targets of trust, it is perfectly possible that mod-
ern (rich, democratic) peoples are trusted more. This is close to the idea that pres-
tige and reputation are the main criteria we use when deciding whether or not to
trust other people (Parsons 1980, Sztompka 1999). How do national groups at large
acquire prestige? My hunch is that their reputation depends on how well they match
the Western ideal of modernity based on rationality, efficiency and universalistic
behaviour, of which economic wealth and effective democratic institutions are visi-
ble signs. I have collected five different measures of this broad concept of “moder-
nity”, but since modernisation usually forms a tightknit syndrome, empirically it
will be hardly possible to separate out the effects of economic and political modern-
isation. Compared to Southern and Eastern Europe, the established democracies of
Northern and Western Europe are also less plagued by corruption and their citizens
enjoy higher living standards. Therefore I have factor analysed the different meas-
ures into a single factor, which reflects each country’s level of modernisation (see
Appendix for more information).
? How strongly are feelings of threat impacting on trust ratings? Big and powerful na-
tions may be seen by others as a threat to their independence and national security,
and so it is possible that big nations are less trusted than small ones. In the compu-
tation, population size is taken as a measure of power. Furthermore, defeats and
victories in wars are of paramount importance for a nation’s collective memory
(Cerruti 2001). Former alliances could weld people together, whereas enmities
could draw people apart. Presumably, both effects occur. In this analysis, I concen-
trate on alliances and enmities during WWII.
The key results of the regression analysis are as follows (Table 2):
Trust between nations does not significantly decline with spatial distance, if other
determinants are controlled for, especially cultural similarity. Hence, it is not proximity as
such that explains why trust is higher among neighbouring countries but the increasing
commonalities between them that often go along with spatial closeness. For Eurocrats, it is
certainly good news that trust between nationalities does not necessarily reflect immutable
geographic characteristics. The physical size of a community does not in itself predetermine
its potential for trust.10
The shared experience of working together within the framework of EU institutions has
only a small effect on trust. In the regression, the coefficient is actually negative; however,
this is an artefact caused by Nordic exceptionalism. The Nordic countries are universally
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regarded as highly trustworthy and themselves show high levels of transnational trust. Since
it happens to be that two of the three Nordic countries involved here, Sweden and Finland,
joined the EU relatively recently, the effect of common membership years shows up as a
negative one. However, if one controls for Nordic exceptionalism in the regression,
common membership years have a small positive impact on trust. Taken together, trust and
distrust seem not crucially related to formal membership status.
Trust is higher between culturally related countries. Language ties in particular are
conducive to trust. In part at least, transnational trust, as a specific form of generalised trust,
is also based on primordial characteristics, or mechanic solidarity, to use Durkheim’s
famous term. The pay-off of language ties is stronger than that of a common religious
tradition, presumably because language is more important than religion for people’s life
chances and political identity. However, the impact of religious affinity becomes stronger
if one distinguishes only among three religious backgrounds: Western Christian, Orthodox
and Muslim (loosely following Huntington’s idea of civilisations (Huntington 1997)). This
may point to the fact that it is not religious divisions as such that impact weakly on trust, but
rather the division between Catholic and Protestant countries.
The modernisation level of the rated nationality is of paramount importance. The more
developed a nation is, the more trusted are its people. Economic wealth, a robust democracy
and high-quality public institutions combine to produce an image of integrity and reliability,
which then converts into attributed trustworthiness. In addition, the level of modernisation
of the nation doing the trust rating is important, although to a lesser extent. The higher a
country’s level of modernity, the more its citizenry trusts other nationalities. Material
security and institutions of accountability, including the rule of law, might help to solve the
problem of the free delivery of trust, which is a central problem in trust relations (Coleman
1990). In contrast, less modern societies provide only limited solutions to this problem.
Perceived threat complicates trust. Small nationalities usually inspire a high level of
trust, whereas powerful nations are perceived with some caution, no matter how culturally
close or how rich and democratic they are. Contrary to expectations, past alliances and
enmities seem not to influence strongly how EU citizens think about other nations. If we take
neutral nations as reference points, Europeans do not trust their former allies any more than
they do neutral nations. Past enmity seems to give rise to some distrust in a bivariate analysis,
but this effect vanishes if we control for the other variables. It goes without saying, however,
that WWII still casts a cloud over some specific relations, like Polish-German or Czech-
German relations.
Is it possible to say what matters most? The technical problem preventing an easy answer
is that the predictors are correlated to some extent.11 Nevertheless, it is possible to derive
some conclusions about relative importance by following a procedure developed by
Schulze (no date). With help of a series of regressions, the maximum and minimum
explanatory power of each variable, or group of variables, is calculated (see Table 3 for
detailed information on the procedure). The main message we get is that the modernisation
level of the rated nationality matters most for trust. Its maximum power exceeds that of the
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other predictors by far, and even its minimum power is almost as strong as the maximum
power of the second strongest bloc of variables, which is cultural similarity. There remains
some ambiguity about the ranking of the other determinants, but a reasonable overall
ranking is as follows: (1) degree of modernisation of the rated nationality; (2) cultural
affinity; (3) perceived threat; (4) modernisation level of the country doing the rating. Hence,
it is not immutable geographical or primordial traits that determine trust in the first place,
but a universalistic attribute which can be subject to change: the degree of modernity.
Nations can become more modern and thereby gain a better reputation and greater trust.
Table 2: Regression on dyadic transnational trust (OLS regression)
* Significant at .05-level; ** significant at .01-level; significant at .001-level.
Number of observations: 309 country dyads, EU-25 plus candidate countries (as far as available).
 
 Model 1  Model 2  
 beta t beta t 
Distance     
       Distance between capitals  -.056 -.1249 .025 .633 
Community membership-     
      Common EC/EU years -.059 -1.410 -.057 -1.670 
Cultural similarity     
      Same family of religions (dummy) .083 1.698 = = 
      Same family of religions, Huntington 
      typology (dummy) 
= = .190*** 4.930 
      Same family of languages (dummy) .146*** 3.671 .187*** 5.172 
Reputation rated nationality     
      Level of modernity of rated  
      nationality 
.673*** 16.822 .576*** 13.896 
Perceived threat     
      Population size rated nationality -.179*** 5.379 -.095** -2.971 
      Allies in WWII (dummy) -.071 -1.809 -.039 -1.180 
      Enemies in WWII (dummy) -.302 -.829 -.019 -.561 
Level of modernity of rating nationality     
      Level of modernity rating nationality .246*** 7.420 .189*** 6.253 
     
Adjusted R2 .69 .72 
Number of cases 309 309 
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A second, alternative model was also calculated, including the alternative measure of
religious affinity based on Huntington. It should be noted that this measure gives religion
(and thereby culture in general) more power, which is clearly reflected in our maximum-
minimum calculations. Nevertheless, the modernisation level of the rated nationality retains
its winning position, so that the main message remains the same. However, this second
model reminds us that cultural particularism is another strong source of cohesiveness, so
that cultural overstretch indeed might pose a threat for the EU’s aim to form a cohesive
community.
Table 3: Relative power of main predictors of trust
Number of observations: 309 country dyads, EU-25 plus candidate countries (as far as available).
* In Model 2, same family of religions is measured using Huntington’s typology of religions.
Annotation: In Model 1, the two variables measuring cultural similarity, language and religion, ex-
plain 27% of the variance in unidirectional trust between nations, if they are used in a regression as
the only predictor variables. This is tantamount to the maximum power of cultural similarity. Em-
ployed in one single regression, all predictor variables together explain 69% of the variance in trust.
If the cultural variables are removed and  a further regression is carried out, the other predictors still
explain 66% of the variance in trust. Thus the minimum power of cultural similarity is 3%. It can be
concluded that the “true” power of cultural similarity  with regard to trust lies somewhere between
3% and 27% ,but it is impossible to say where exactly. The maximum and minimum power of each
predictor variable (or set of predictor variables) can be computed in the same way (cf. Schulze, no
date).
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Explained variance in % 
Predictor variables(s) Max Min Max Min 
Modernisation level 
   2 factor scores, rated nation and 
   rating nation 
63 37 63 23 
Cultural similarity 
   2 variables 
27 3 44* 5* 
Perceived threat  
   1 variable 
5 4 5 4 
Total explained variance (R2) 69 71 
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7 Conclusion – enlargements vs. integration?
My starting question was: What was the impact of successive enlargements upon the
integration of the EU? Following Karl Deutsch, integration was conceptualised as the sense
of community across national boundaries and measured as interpersonal trust between EU
nationalities. The key result is that enlargements do not necessarily weaken trust. Northern
enlargement actually strengthened trust levels, despite the fact that it extended the
Community from the central city belt to the Nordic periphery. Southern and Eastern
enlargement, however, weakened integration. The integrative effect of enlargement de-
pends on the extent to which acceding nations differ from the present club members in three
main dimensions: the level of modernisation (mechanisms: prestige), cultural characteris-
tics (mechanisms: similarity) and their power in the international system (mechanisms:
perceived threat). The recent enlargement has made an already diverse Community
(Zielonka and Mair 2002) even more diverse, particularly with respect to modernisation
levels and culture. The EU of 25 is a very unequal and heterogeneous place in which to live.
Without much doubt, the coming enlargements towards the Southeast will also qualify as
centrifugal, given the big economic gap and the cultural differences between the applicant
countries and the member states. Turkey surely is especially problematic, given that it also
has a large population.
It can be argued that both processes, enlargement and integration, follow different logics
if, and only if, the strategy behind expansion is “calculated inclusion” (Vobruba 2003,
Vobruba 2005), as was the case with southern and eastern enlargement (but not with the
other expansions). Calculated inclusion means that the core member states were seeking to
protect their prosperity and stability by including their poorer and less time-tested neigh-
bouring countries on acceptable institutional conditions and at reasonable financial cost.
However, the analysis has shown that “calculated inclusion” threatens to undermine mutual
trust, producing a trade-off between enlargement and integration. The Copenhagen criteria
are useful for limiting integration costs by defining sticking points related to reputation, but
on the other hand, they are not high enough to preclude such costs. Beyond this trade-off,
calculated inclusion causes two further problems. Firstly, it reveals a certain degree of
tension between the formal and informal processes involved in creating a European societal
community. In formal terms, citizenship of the Union grants certain rights and entitlements
to all EU citizens, irrespective of nationality. Informally – and in stark contrast – the
readiness to trust others varies according to nationality. This incongruity between formal
demarcations through EU law and informal demarcations through graded levels of trust
might come into conflict with each other. Secondly, inasmuch as a strong sense of
community – common identity, empathy, trust – among the general public is necessary to
get further measures of political amalgamation accepted, there might be an additional trade-
off between enlarging and deepening the Union. It must be admitted, however, that the
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single member states hold very different opinions about whether deepening is a valuable
goal (Böckenförde 2003) and Lewis has argued that, by and large, each expansion, even the
more problematic ones, has strengthened the EU as an institution (Lewis 2001). It goes
without saying that this paper is neither a policy prescription nor an attempt to define the EU
as a “Western club for the rich”. Moreover, there is always a variety of motives for admitting
new members, of which “integration” as defined in this paper is only one. Although recent
accessions put cohesiveness under strain, the Community might gain from growing
diversity in other respects.
The data cannot tell us whether eastern and the coming south-eastern enlargement will
simply postpone or impede the emergence of a well-integrated community of Europeans.
Opponents can refer to the centrifugal impact the recent enlargement has had on overall trust
levels. Proponents can refer to the situation of the EC-6 in the 1970s, when the level of trust
between the national groups was similar to that in today’s enlarged EU. Moreover, past
experience has shown that transnational trust is not constant, but variable. There are good
reasons for saying that the best remedy against distrust of ‘distant’ peoples is EU
membership. We can assume that the notion of “westward enlargement” – the very idea that
Western Europe is exporting its political institutions and way of life to the Eastern lands and
thus turning „Easterners“ into “Westerners” in the long run – is the main reason why trust
in people from accession countries will grow over time. However, this might be attributed
to two developments. Firstly, the successful modernisation of accession countries can be
seen as crucial, both for raising their attributed reputation and for making them willing to
vest more trust in other nationalities, whether in Western or Eastern Europe. Secondly, in
the old member states welfare gains benefiting broad swathes of the population are
necessary to prevent widespread anti-EU resentments, which might be directed against the
newcomers.
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Notes
1 To keep the time series for Germany intact, only West Germans were included, even after unification.
2 Comparisons over time are complicated by slight changes in the instrument (see Delhey 2004a).
3 More precisely, we are dealing with a doubly saturated network, given each nation’s dual role as truster
and trusted (Knoke and Kuklinski 1982).
4 In quantitative terms, the EU-25 consists of 300 dyads with a total of 600 one-directional relations. With
our data, we have 270 of these 600 relations at hand.
5 According to the logic of enlargement, the EU-6 is the benchmark for the North-West enlargement. For
southward enlargement, it is the EU-9 and for northern enlargement the EU-12. The analysis was carried
out without considering the “silent enlargement” of 1990, when the East Germans joined.
6 A comparison of these surveys with our information on transnational trust derived from EBs reveals that
at the aggregated country level (which gives us 15 cases, namely the 15 old member states), generalised
trust in “most people” correlates significantly with average trust in the EU 9 nationalities (excluding co-
nationals). Since we have no other information to hand, the former can be used as a proxy for transnational
trust, although respondents cannot be expected to limit themselves to EU nationalities when deciding
whether “most people” deserve to be trusted.
7 No information on Cyprus in the EVS.
8 Unfortunately, the time series does not start until 1976, three years after the first enlargement.
9 Own translation from German.
10 It is perfectly possible that proximity is conducive to trust in pre-modern societies only, cf. Inglehart
1991.
11 However, collinearity is not so high as to rule out the possibility of using these variables in one single
regression.
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Appendix: Coding of predictor variables
Geographical distance
Distance between the two capitals of each pair of countries (in km, as the crow flies).
Common membership years
Number of shared years of EC/EU membership of each pair of countries. 1997 as year of
reference. Scores ranging from 0 (rated nationality not member state in 1997) to 40 (both
countries founding members of the Community).
Same language family
Dummy variable with 1 = same and 0 = different family of languages. The following
language groups were identified: Germanic, Romance, Greek, Finno-Ugric, Slav, Baltic
and Turkish. Due to the particular language constellation, France and Belgium were coded
as belonging to the same family of languages.
Same religious family
Dummy variable with 1 = same and 0 = different family of religions. Basis of classification
was the historically dominant religious tradition. The following religious traditions were
identified: Protestant, Catholic, Greek-Orthodox and Islamic. Bi-confessional countries
(mixed Protestant-Catholic) like the Netherlands and Germany are coded as ‘similar’ to
both Protestant and Catholic countries. In a second version of this variable, drawing on
Huntington’s idea of civilizations (Huntington 1997), Protestant and Catholic countries are
combined under the label ‘Western Christian’ and distinguished from Orthodox und Islamic
countries.
National wealth:
GDP per capita (1997) in purchasing power parities, Eurostat data.
Level of corruption
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) from Transparency International, 1997 or later years (10
= “free” – 0 = “highly corrupt”).
Freedom House Index
Ratings for political rights and civil liberties (see www.freedomhouse.org) which, for the
purposes of this work, were combined into a single political freedom score. The higher the
score the greater the freedom. Because it may be some time before political freedom can
create a climate of trust, a measure for the mean level of freedom over 20 years (1976-1997)
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was also constructed. For countries newly established during this time period, the scores of
the predecessor country were taken for the missing years.
Factor score modernization level, rated nation:
Constructed from (factor loadings in brackets): cumulated Freedom House score 1972-
1996 (.961); GDP per capita in ppp (.938); absence of corruption (.912); former communist
country (-.862); Freedom House score 1996 (.735). The five single indicators explain 78%
of the variance of the common factor ‘modernisation’.
Factor score modernization level, rating nation:
Constructed from (factor loadings in brackets): cumulated Freedom House score 1972-
1996 (.912); GDP per capita in ppp (.902); absence of corruption (.899); Freedom House
score 1996 (.768). The four single indicators explain 76% of the variance of the common
factor ‘modernisation’.
Power
The number of inhabitants (in millions) was taken as measuring the country’s relative power
in the international system.
Allies and enemies in WWII
Based on the classification allies, axis powers and neutrals, two dummy variables were
created: allies (1= yes, 0 = no), and enmity (1= yes, 0 = no).
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